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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine, and whether
the endeavor was successful. In order for Russian hybrid warfare to have been
successful, the costs and repercussions of their actions must not outweigh their achieved
goals. For this thesis, it was assumed that Russia’s goals are: locking NATO and the EU
out of Russia’s remaining sphere of influence, demonstrating Russian solidarity, gaining
territory, and boosting popularity for the current administration. Russia was able to
achieve all of these goals with the annexation of Crimea and use of military force in the
Donbass region. The costs of these actions included high military spending,
infrastructure costs and financial losses, and international backlash. This can be separated
into the economic and political sector. Economically, Russia faces massive costs, which
are sure to increase in the coming years, in an already weakened economy. Politically,
Russia has been shunned by the West and now seeks closer ties with its eastern
neighbors. While these costs are high, EU and NATO presence has not spread further
West, Russia has shown its ability to act in the region, and Putin’s popularity in Russia
remains extremely high. With these factors in mind, it can be deemed that Russia’s
hybrid war in Ukraine was successful, although marginally so.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Ukraine fell under attack from several different sources, including
attacks on their economic security and unknown military personnel leading riots and
taking control of buildings. These events were later attributed to Russia and called a
hybrid war. To what extent has Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine been successful? For
any actor to be successful, they must meet their goals while sustaining reasonable or
expected losses. According to the Kremlin, Russia’s only reason for intervening in
Ukraine is to protect ethnic Russians. However, this thesis argues that some other
motives may be inferred based on previous Russian actions. The events leading up to the
hybrid war shed some light on what these motives may be. A major event that started the
conflict in Ukraine, was the Euromaidan, a massive protest of the Ukrainian people. The
Ukrainian people were looking to begin a partnership with the EU. The then Ukrainian
president instead decided to reaffirm a partnership with Russia, leading to protests that
would eventually turn violent. The EU and NATO both require a country to be in full
control of its territory in order to gain member status. Further, neither organization wants
to earn the ire of Russia by admitting a member that is currently in a conflict with
Moscow. Thus, Russia was attempting to keep Western influence from its borders. The
conflict has also been construed as a show of strength by the current Russian
administration. Putin is able to show his government’s control over the region, and how
much he cares for Russians everywhere, earning him popularity with his citizens. By

contrasting these goals with the costs and repercussions that have followed Russia’s
hybrid war, I determine that Russia’s hybrid war was relatively successful.
The definition of hybrid warfare differs slightly from scholar to scholar, but the
most generally accepted definition is that put forth by the NATO Capstone Concept,
which states that “hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to
simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit
of their objectives.” 1 The European Union defines a hybrid war as a situation where a
country uses armed forces and a mix of other factors, such as economic or political. 2
Frank Hoffman, a security specialist, defines hybrid warfare as incorporating a range of
different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and
formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal
disorder.3 While it is the most widely accepted, NATO’s definition is very broad and
leaves many questions with its definition. Conversely, Hoffman’s definition cuts out
much of the scope of what hybrid warfare can be. All definitions seem to agree that
hybrid warfare combines conventional and non-conventional means.

Conventional

military is understandable enough, but non-conventional is left open ended without
clarification. Non-conventional is the use of anything other than military force against
another entity to achieve an objective. This would include cyber-attacks, impeding

1

Michael Aaronson et al. "NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat." (Prism 2, no. 4 (2012)) 111-24.
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_2-4/Prism_111-124_Aaronson-Diessen.pdf.
Members’ Research Services, “At a Glance”, (European Parliament, 2015), accessed 3/20/17
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/564355/EPRS_ATA(2015)564355_EN.pdf
2

3

Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Publication. Center for Emerging
Threats and Opportunities, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. 14.

2

industry, or covert operations, for example. A notable attribute of these means is that the
effects are in plain view of the public, but allow the one responsible to wave off
accusations.

Putting these definitions together, hybrid warfare is war fought using

multiple dimensions (e.g. the cyber, criminal, political, or economic) in concert with the
military against an actor, state or non-state, in order to achieve a goal.
There are some who do not believe hybrid warfare to be a reality, such as Michael
Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, who question whether or not hybrid warfare or threats
are terms we even need in our vocabulary when discussing the issue. According to them,
these threats have all been seen individually, and to term them as something new is to
mislead the public4. Aaronson, et al. disagrees, and states that, while we may have seen
all these threats before, we have never seen them used together as effectively as we do
today. Using the article “Mif о ‘gibridnoi voine’" (Myth of ‘hybrid war’) as a Russian
perspective, it can be assumed that Russians would err on the side of Kofman and
Rojansky. This article, by Ruslan Puhov, is in opposition to much of the Western
literature, such as Hoffman’s Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars and,
as the title suggest, calls hybrid war a myth and states that the actions dictated as being
hybrid war are now standard in most military engagements 5. Kofman and Rojansky do
not disregard hybrid warfare to the extent seen in the article by Puhov. Instead, they
claim that what is now being called hybrid warfare in regards to Russia is a series of
Michael Kofman, and Matthew Rojansky."A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War’." Kennan Cable,
April
2015.
Accessed
September
18,
2016
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/190090/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/81eee96de368-4b10-8f2e-4d801467a538/en/5-KENNAN CABLE-ROJANSKY KOFMAN.pdf
4

Ruslan Puhov. “Mif о "gibridnoi voine"" / Realii / Nezavisimaja gazeta. September 5, 2015. Accessed
September 18, 2016 http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html
5
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events that would be hard to replicate in any other conflict due to the circumstances and
capabilities of Russia in the region. By naming them hybrid warfare and acting to protect
itself, NATO and other international organizations have put fear into something that has
not developed enough to warrant a reaction in any way.
Determining the successes and costs of hybrid warfare is important, as it gives
some insight into where and when one might expect a hybrid threat to appear. Hybrid
conflicts may vary from actor to actor, but the situations they are used in are largely
similar, namely when one agent or state intends to engage in a conflict with another that
is objectively stronger militarily or to avoid other consequences. Russia used this tactic
in order to avoid some consequences from the international community. By determining
whether Russia’s hybrid war specifically is successful, it may be possible to determine
whether Russia will use it again. Determining the costs plays a similar role. Comparing
the perceived benefits of a hybrid operation and the associated costs could help to predict
whether it is in Russia’s, or possibly another actor’s, interests to continue with the
strategy of hybrid warfare. Some scholarship on the topic of the Ukraine Crisis, such as
Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West by Andrew Wilson 6 , shed light on the
relationship between Russia and Ukraine and how this relationship led to conflict and
turmoil in the Donbass region.

Richard Sakwa’s Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the

Borderlands does much the same, with more of a focus on Ukraine than Russia and the
West.7 Neither of these works touches on the effect of hybrid warfare in the conflict
itself. Wilson makes some note of hybrid warfare, but he does not linger on the subject.

6

Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis What It Means to the West, New Haven: Yale 2014

7

Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine Crisis in the Borderlands, I.B. Tauris & Co. 2015

4

He briefly discusses why a hybrid war was favorable for Russia and some tools they
utilized, but little else.8
Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine began in late February of 2014, following the
events of Euromaidan. Armed men of an obviously military nature appeared on the
Crimean Peninsula. These men did not identify themselves as part of any nation’s army,
nor did they wear any identifying insignia’s. These men quickly took control of capital
buildings in Simferapol and Sevastopol.9 This quickly led to the referendum for Crimea
to join Russia, which many countries have refused to accept. Later in 2014, similar
troops were found in the Donbass regions of Ukraine, taking control of important
buildings and equipment, as well as leading separatist groups in the regions.10 This series
of events falls under all definitions of hybrid warfare, as Russia did not need to use overt
force to achieve its goals, and did not rely solely on any one irregular tactic. Instead,
Russia used several pre-existing conditions in order to create chaos in Ukraine. The only
forces present were officially unidentifiable and, in the Donbass region, were leading
bands of Ukrainian rebels against their government. Media channels were not only
seized, but were replaced. Russia used its control of hydrocarbon markets to further
destabilize Ukraine. All these came together to create a conflict without an invasion ever
being declared or any kind of identifiable war having begun.

8

Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, pg. 192

9

Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, pg. 110-111

10

Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, pg. 126

5

6

CHAPTER 1: CREATING THE HYBRID WAR IN UKRAINE
In order to determine the degree of success Russia has had in their use of hybrid war in
Ukraine, we must first examine the variables that led to crises in Crimea and the
Donbass. Moscow has taken similar actions (disinformation campaigns, invasions,
shows of force) in the past against former Soviet Republics who wish to, or are, partnered
with the West. Georgia in 2008 and the Baltics in 2013 serve as examples of this.
However, neither of these instances had the same degree of preparation and varied tactics
or had quite the same effect on the intended victim as the tactics used against Ukraine. In
2013, Russia put large military forces along the borders it shares with the Baltics for
military training purposes. Many in the Baltics felt that this was a show of force against
their joining NATO in 2004. In 2008, Russia began a war with Georgia over the status of
the separatist region of South Ossetia.11 In nations that have not attempted to turn West,
Russia has used its existing political influence in the former Soviet Union to create the
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and integrate them into a trade network. This has
allowed Russia to have more influence over these countries and prevents future attempts
to join the EU and other economic or political organizations.12 In Ukraine, Russia has
Ott Ummelas and Aaron Eglitis, “Russian War Games on Baltic border spark security fears”, Bloomberg,
September 2013, accessed 1/21/2017 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-20/russian-wargames-on-baltic-border-spark-security-fears
11

Anne Applebaum, “Russia invades Georgia while the West watches”, Slate, August 2008, accessed
1/10/2017http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2008/08/world_inaction.html
Jan Strzelecki, “Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis”, OSW, February 2016, accessed 1/21/2017
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-02-01/eurasian-economic-union-a-timecrisis
12
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adopted a different strategy, utilizing its own control of energy infrastructure and
hydrocarbons as a weapon, and its capability to influence Ukrainian citizens through
shared language and media in an attempt to convince the Ukrainian public not to trust
their government. Through these variables Russia was able to begin a hybrid war.
Language has both divided and unified Ukraine since independence. Before
1991, Ukraine was under the control of other, more powerful nations and empires. These
polities often sought to impose their own language on the people of Ukraine, as seen
during Russification under the Soviet Union.13 Many Ukrainian speakers likely see their
language as distinguishing themselves from Russians. So it stands to reason that those
who speak Russian would identify more as Russians. As seen in Figure 3, those that both
speak Russian and identify as ethnically Russian were more likely to agree with Russia’s
decision to intervene in Ukraine. Ethnic ties to Russia are already strong due to
Ukraine’s obvious proximity to Russia and the history they share. These ties are
strongest in the oblasts of Southeast Ukraine, specifically Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk,
Donetsk, Kharkov, Kherson, Lugansk, and Zaporozhye. These regions are affected the
most by Russian influence and culture, although most of these areas still have a majority
population that identifies as Ukrainian.14 Crimea, Lugansk, and Donetsk are among those
that have a larger than average percentage of people who identify as ethnically Russian.
Crimea’s larger than normal percentage of ethnic Russians made it the first target of
hybrid tactics. Russian soldiers without insignia were able to take control and most likely
Anne Applebaum, “The Victory of Ukraine”, New York
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/07/the-victory-of-ukraine/
13

Review

of

Books,

2016

Nicolai Petro, “Understanding the Other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone Ukraine”,
Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda, and Perspectives, 2015, accessed 2/15/2017
http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf
14
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force a referendum. After the fact, Putin stated that this was done in an effort to protect
Russians everywhere. 15 This show of apparent concern for the region as well as a
gratuitous show of force further bonded the Crimean people to Russia, while western
regions were less responsive.16 The Donbass region does not have the same ethnic ties
to Russia, but they do have a majority population who speak Russian, again going back to
language. According to Serhy Yekelchyk, this adoption of the Russian language during
the Soviet Era bonded the people of the Donbass to the USSR, and then to the Russian
patriarchy following the USSR’s collapse.17
Due to its history in the Soviet Union and the prominence of the Russian
language, much of Ukraine’s media in the south and east comes from Russia.18 . Moscow
was able to use this influence over Russian speaking Ukrainians to promote their
narrative of events in Ukraine. Disinformation campaigns like this are a key component
of hybrid warfare, and serve to keep a society off balance or polarized. Russia is able to
do this in Ukraine through Channels like Channel One and Russia 24 are state owned.
Moscow has been able to do this to great effect in their own country, with government
controlled mass media directly, and powerfully, influencing public opinion to suit the
needs of the Kremlin19. Russian media spoke of the Ukrainian government killing its
‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, President of Russia website, 18 March 2014, accessed
3/21/2017 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
15

16

Boris Nemtsov, Ilya Yashin, Olga Shorina, Putin. War, http://4freerussia.org/putin.war/Putin.WarEng.pdf pg. 13-15
17

Serhy Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press
2015, pg. 116-117
Jill Dougherty, “Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Transformation”, Shorenstein
Center
on
Media,
Politics,
and
Public
Policy,
July
2014,
accessed
3/2/2017
https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/d88-dougherty.pdf
18

19

Dougherty, “Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Transformation”
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citizens in the Donbass region in a fashion similar to the holocaust, spurring more people
to join the separatist cause and call for the regions autonomy. 20

Russian media also

defames Western governments, specifically the United States, by stating that they are
providing weapons to the “fascist” Ukrainian government, and citing pictures of past
American transports in Latvia and Lithuania as America’s current involvement in
Ukraine.21 Through reports like these, Russia attempts to convince Ukrainian citizens,
specifically those that identify as Russian, that the Ukrainian government does not have
their best interests at heart. Russian media and propaganda perpetuated the lie of
separatists being only Ukrainian citizens for as long as possible, but after some months it
became evident that Russians were leading the few Ukrainians in the conflict. Polls from
2014 show that only a small portion of Eastern Ukraine agreed with Russian intervention.
In fact, the majority of Ukrainians in every region polled believed that it was unnecessary
for Russia to send in troops. Figure 3 shows that even those that identify as ethnic
Russians are divided as to whether or not Russian intervention is beneficial. The same
percentage of people view the intervention as both favorable and unfavorable.22

20

Kim, “Putin waging information warfare in Ukraine”

Laas Leivat, “Russian Propaganda: Twisted, fabricated, insidious Estonian Life”, Estonian World
Review, February 2015, accessed 1/10/2017 http://www.eesti.ca/russian-propaganda-twisted-fabricatedinsidious-estonian-life/article44443
21

Baltic Surveys/Gallup Organization, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine March 14-26, 2014”,
March
2014,
pg.
7
accessed
1/21/2017
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of
%20Ukraine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf
22

10

Figure 1

Figure 2

11

Figure 3
Source: Baltic Surveys/Gallup Organization, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine March 14-26, 2014”, March 2014, pg.7
accessed

1/21/2017

http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine,%20March%
2014-26,%202014.pdf

Russia has also exerted pressure on Ukraine’s energy sector, which has hurt the
Ukrainian economy and made them ever more dependent on Russia. Before the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had its own effective hydrocarbon infrastructure, although it
relied on its ties to Russia to make use of the capital in place. However, after becoming
12

independent from the Union, Ukraine’s hydrocarbon producing industry has fallen into
disrepair due to corruption, lack of modernization, and other organizational issues. This
has led to a strong reliance on Russian natural gas.23 Russia has used its dominance of the
hydrocarbon market in order to severely damage the economy of Ukraine. This
originally began in 2003 with Russia’s decision to develop alternative pipelines to bypass
Ukraine, and therefore bypass Ukraine’s taxes (i.e., Blue Stream and Baltic Pipeline
Systems).24 This was followed by an increase in gas prices to Ukraine, meant to further
destabilize the economy. Ukraine is heavily reliant on natural gas, and any increase in
price will damage its economy. Ukraine was forced into an agreement with $485 per
thousand cubic meters in April of 2014, while Germany and other European countries
paid over a hundred dollars less per thousand cubic meters.25 This was the climax of
Russian price escalation that began in 2005. Between the years of 2010 and 2013,
Ukraine was paying roughly the same amount annually as Germany, a country with a
much higher demand for resources.26 A few months after the final price agreement was
struck, Russia ceased sending any gas at all to Ukraine. The coal industry in Ukraine was
subsequently destroyed, as separatists took control of or destroyed much of the necessary
infrastructure, likely under the suggestions of Russian military officers or government
officials. Had it not been for the relatively warm winter, things may have been much
Jeffrey Tayler, “Russia Raises Natural Gas Threat against Ukraine”, National Geographic, March 2014,
accessed 1/21/2017 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/03/140303-russia-natural-gasthreat-against-ukraine/
23

Mykhailo Gonchar, Andriy Chubyk, & Oksana Ishchuk, “Energy Component in New Generation
Warfare,” (Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”: “Antare Project,” August 2015, accessed 10/16/2016
http://geostrategy.org.ua/images/August_2015_Hybrid_Aggression_final.pdf
24

Nataliia Slobodia, “Energy Instruments of hybrid warfare”, Stratfor, March 2016, accessed 1/19/2017
https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/energy-instruments-%E2%80%9Chybrid-warfare%E2%80%9D
25

26

Gonchar, “Energy Component in New Generation Warfare”
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worse. Even so, Kiev found it necessary to implement rolling blackouts and lessen the
power consumption of some industries.
Russia was able to damage more than just the current Ukrainian economy through its
control of the energy sector. Russia has slandered Ukraine with accusations of gas theft
and refusal to pay owed debts in 2009, followed by Russia turning off the transport of gas
through Ukraine. This hurt not only Ukraine, but also Europe and Russia itself, as
Ukraine held the one pipeline between the two. Russia used accusations and its refusal to
sell to show Europe that Ukraine was an untrustworthy partner. Construction of pipelines
that bypass Ukraine are also a constant threat to the country. Russia already transports
half as much gas through Ukraine than it did in the last decade. Should Russia choose to
abandon the Ukraine pipeline altogether, Ukraine would become nearly obsolete as a
political or economic partner to both Russia and Europe. Lack of gas and a large portion
of the countries income could force Ukraine to give in to Russian demands, and possibly
hand over control of its government altogether.27
Finally, Russia leveraged considerable political control over the government of
Ukraine. The events of Euromaidan in 2013-2014, which was the spark for the Ukraine
crisis, can be somewhat attributed to Russian power over influential figures in Ukrainian
politics. The president at the time, Victor Yanukovych, was a Russian leaning politician
who had been given the choice between moving towards the West and signing an EU
association agreement, or reaffirming ties with Russia by taking a loan bailout and
beginning the process of joining the EAEU. Popular support was for the EU agreement,
and Yanukovych had declared that he would sign for the EU. However, he broke his
27

Tayler, “Russia raises natural gas threat against Ukraine”
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word and suspended talks with the EU, leading to the protests that would soon turn
deadly28. He has since fled to Russia and possibly been given Russian citizenship under
suspicious circumstances. Yanukovych’s decision can most likely be attributed to
Russian pressure and incentivizing. The Eurasian Union has much fewer standards for
entry when compared to the EU, as it serves less as an economic union and more as a
stronger bond between Russia and the other members. By contrast, the EU has several
qualifications that need to be met in full before a nation can be considered for assessment,
eventually leading to membership. These high standards are the reasons so many eastern
European countries have found trouble joining the organization. The deal offered by
Russia would also provide much needed short term relief for the Ukrainian government
and economy by removing some of the Russian debt that Ukraine had accrued 29. It has
been speculated however, that the long term benefits of any agreement with the EU
would far outweigh any of the short term promises made by Moscow. Ukrainian industry
would suffer for some few years as it adapted to the more favorable European industries
competing for trade, but would eventually see large profits due to access to new
technologies and markets it would never have. Many Ukrainians, possibly 50% or more,
saw the better standards of living and more democratic countries in Europe as a positive,
as well as it effectively removing Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence. The most
plausible reasons for Yanukovych choosing Russia’s deal are short-sightedness and his

Serhiy Kudelia, “The House that Yanukovych Built”, Journal of Democracy, July 2014, accessed
3/2/2017 http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine-25-3.pdf
28

Katelyn Ferral, “On the Brink: Viktor Yanukovych’s Decisions and the Ukrainian Retreat from Europe”,
University
of
North
Carolina,
2014,
pg.
29-31,
accessed
3/2/17
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:405c11d5-cddd-4a63-855e-4301352740e4
29

15

own predisposition towards, as well as pressure from, Russia overriding the wants of his
own people30.

Judy Woodruff and Steven Pifer, “Why did Ukraine’s Yanukovych give in to Russian pressure on EU
deal?”, PBS Newshour, December 2013, accessed 3/2/2017 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-julydec13-ukraine2_12-02/
30

Ferral, “On the Brink”
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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC LOSSES SUSTAINED BY RUSSIA

Russia’s actions in Ukraine have had an effect on their own side of the border,
notably in their finances. Any conflict has its share of financial costs, but many of
Russia’s come from non-traditional expenses. In a normal conflict, both sides would
have considerable military expenditures. Russia would have also faced considerably
more backlash than economic sanctions, as the international community would have more
evidence to base their decisions on. However, Russia’s multi-pronged strategy of hybrid
warfare has multiple price tags attached, while simultaneously allowing them to act
without fear of military or grave political repercussions. Not only has Russia had to pay
for increased military, both their own and any supplies they may or may not have given
to Ukrainian separatists, but there are also the costs associated with annexing Crimea and
the sanctions that followed. Where a modern war would have involved increased
spending on weaponry, Moscow has likely spent more paying families to agree not to talk
about how family members in the military died. Due to the nature of hybrid war, all
Russian personnel acting in Ukraine have to be paid under the table, likely at an increased
rate, as well as anyone who maintains contact with them. For a limited, short-term
engagement, hybrid warfare may have been more cost-effective, but as time has dragged
on and more Russian soldiers have been killed in action, the cost of keeping involvement
unknown has increased. Moscow not only has to pay the military under the table, but
possibly pro-Russian protesters and rioters.
17

By assessing the financial drawback of Russia’s strategy, it can be determined
whether or not Russia has overspent on the conflict, which will help in determining
whether or not hybrid warfare was successful in the conflict in Ukraine. The three most
prominent costs are those of the military, both overt and anonymous, the present and
future price of Crimea, and the sanctions that were imposed afterwards.
Determining the financial cost of military assets that Russia has invested in
Ukraine is no easy task, largely because of the disinformation spread by Russia and
Moscow’s unwillingness to be forthcoming about both their actions in Ukraine and the
full extent of their military. Multiple sources of data could give some insight into how
much Russia has spent on the military dimension of their hybrid conflict in Ukraine.
Russia’s military budget is one such source, however, we cannot know whether the
reported amounts are accurate or not, as multiple organizations, such as the International
Institute of Security Studies and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) estimate that Russian defense spending is generally higher than the reported
defense budget. The goal of looking at Russian military expenditures through the years is
to see whether there is an uncharacteristic increase in military spending due to the
Ukraine crisis. This spike in expenditures could then be attributed to the conflict itself.
Information from Trading Economics (which uses data from World Bank) shows
little variation in military spending. As evidenced in Figure 4, the general trend here
appears to be approximately a 5-6000 increase per year in USD million. This seems to be
the consensus, as Figure 5 shows the same data presented by SIPRI. We would expect an
increase in the years 2014 or 2015 to show an increase in military spending due to the

18

Ukrainian conflict. From this information, we cannot conclude that Russian military
spending has increased any more than it would have without the Ukrainian conflict.
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Source: SIPRI Milex Data 1998-2015, pg. 20 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-USD.pdf
Figure 4

Viewed apart from Figure 4, Figures 5 and 6 seem to tell a similar story. We see
an increase in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP as GDP falls harshly in 2015.
So, it would be easy to assume that military expenditures could stay the same and still see
an increase in % of GDP. However, when we take all the figures into account, the
continued increase in military spending as GDP falls makes less sense, especially when
compared to the years 2009 and 2010 where military expenditures fell as Russia
recovered from the 2008 market crash.

19

Russian GDP in USD
2,500,000,000,000.00

USD

2,000,000,000,000.00
1,500,000,000,000.00
1,000,000,000,000.00
500,000,000,000.00
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

in

USD,

2015

Year

Source:

World

Data

Bank,

Russia

GDP

per

year

2009-2011,

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2015&locations=RU&start=2009
Figure 5

20

accessed

3/15/2017

Military Expenditure as % of GDP
6

% of GDP

5
4
3
2
1
0
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Year

Source: World Data Bank, Russia Military Expenditure (% of GDP), 2009-2011, accessed 3/15/2017
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=RU&start=2009
Figure 6

However, there is not enough evidence to confirm that the increase in military
spending as Russian GDP falls is directly linked to Russia’s use of military forces in
Ukraine. This is because changes in overall military expenditures usually increase in
preparation for a military conflict and during a standard military conflict. Russia may
have been preparing for a situation like what is happening in Ukraine, however, this is
not a standard symmetric military conflict. Instead, Russia is using limited military
forces. Furthermore, Moscow kept all Russian involvement in Ukraine secret until late
2014, and even then few details were released. It then stands to reason that Russia could,
and most likely would, hide any irregular military expenses. So, in order to estimate
Russia’s expenses in the Ukraine conflict, estimates must be made based on what
armaments and training are reported as being supplied by Russia.
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This information has already been looked into by multiple interested parties and
economists, such as Boris Nemtsov and Andrey Illarionov. According to Nemtsov’s
“War. Putin”, the Russian government spent an estimated total of 53 billion rubles on
various forms of military and upkeep for ten months of the conflict. In addition to that is
the 80 billion rubles spent on pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. In the report,
Nemtsov stated that he knew of nearly 220 Russian soldiers who died in Ukrainian
conflicts from late 2014 to early 2015. He goes on to say that the families of the soldiers
received 2 million rubles to not disclose the reasons for the deaths of the soldiers. Added
on to this is the inevitable costs of refugees. In every war there are those who are
misplaced, and this one was no different. Nemtsov estimated that Russia had payed near
80 billion rubles by July 2014. 31
Costs could be even higher according to Russian economist, and Putin’s former
economic policy advisor, Andrey Illarionov. He puts the cost of the war at nearly 94
billion US dollars, about 5 times as much as the cost estimated in “War. Putin,”. He
gives several reasons for the steep difference:
“all military expenditures in the war against Ukraine are much higher than the direct costs
of carrying out military actions directly on the territory of Ukraine.”
“spending on the preparation and conduct of the war with Ukraine began long before the
start of military operations against Ukraine.”
“the current war begun by the Kremlin is a war not only with Ukraine.”

Anna Dolgov, “Nemtsov report Details human and financial costs of war in Ukraine”, The Moscow
Times, 05/12/15 accessed 11/18/2016 https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/nemtsov-report-details-humanand-financial-costs-of-war-in-ukraine-46471
31
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“additional costs in connection with the preparation and conduct of military operations
are born not only by the state budget but also by the private sector.”32
And because of these reasons, he believes Nemtsov’s report to be incorrect. As an
economist, he does not report on the human and property cost of the war, but he goes into
much greater detail with his estimate. Because Russian rearmament began in 2011, the
increased GDP expenditure on the military must also be included. So, the cost for
Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine could be anywhere between 20 billion and 94 billion US
dollars.
Russia also faces the cost of annexing Crimea from Ukraine. Not only has Russia
taken on the financial burden of adding another region, but Moscow made promises in
2014 to Crimea, which will be costly to implement. These promises are not direct costs of
hybrid warfare, but are consequences of its use and must be taken into consideration.
Russia’s use of political maneuvering, “little green men” (the term used for unidentified
soldiers in Crimea and the Donbass), and ethnic ties all effectively led to the annexation
of Crimea.

If Russia continues to use hybrid warfare in a similar fashion, then

infrastructure costs and promises made will continue to be expensive issues for Moscow.
When Moscow annexed Crimea, it pledged to double state pensions for Crimea,
adding up to an estimated 36 billion rubles annually. Moscow also promised to raise
wages of state workers to the Russian standard, which was estimated to cost 30 billion
rubles a year. The Russian government has also set aside an annual subsidy to Crimea.
Paul Goble, “Putin’s wars already costing Russia ~100 billion US dollars a year, Illarionov says”,
Euromaidan Press, 10/11/15 accessed on 11/18/2016 http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/10/11/putins-warsalready-costing-russia-100-billion-us-dollars-a-year-illarionov-says/
32
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These expenditures combined for 2014 were approximately 55 billion rubles. In addition
to these payments, Russia stated its interest in reducing Crimean dependence on Ukraine.
The first step in doing so is the construction of a road and railway bridge connecting
Russia and Crimea.

The cost of this was estimated at 100 billion rubles in 2014.

Reducing dependence on Ukrainian energy would also prove costly. The Russian energy
minister stated that it would cost up to 100 billion rubles build three power stations in
Crimea. Possible gas pipelines between Russia and Crimea could cost anywhere between
200 million and a billion US dollars. Prices that weren’t estimated for 2014 include
Russian plans to upgrade schools, hospitals, agriculture and other important infrastructure
within Crimea.

According to the Finance minister of Russia, Moscow spent

approximately 243 billion rubles to support Crimea in 2014 alone. This sum includes
both annual spending and one time expenditures, such as infrastructure expenses. The
funds to pay for all of these has been coming from similar programs within Russia,
meaning that not only is the Russian government facing financial deficits, but the Russian
people are having their similar programs redistributed to Crimea. 33 Russia reported a
GRP of 155 billion rubles from Crimea in 2014, meaning that Crimea’s production only
accounts for two thirds of its cost to Russia. The reported GRP is only estimated data,
and only accounts for March through December of 2014. It is very unlikely that the
unaccounted months are able to close the annual deficit, let alone make up for the
structural costs. Added to this amount is the inevitable bill for Ukrainian lawsuits.
Covered under these lawsuits is the seizure of Ukrainian property and the breaking of

Boris Nemtsov, Ilya Yashin, and Olga Shorina, “Putin. War”, Free Russia Foundation,
http://4freerussia.org/putin.war/Putin.War-Eng.pdf
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recognized agreements.

The uncertainty that follows these proceedings has led to

investors pulling away from Crimea, hurting Russia even more.34
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and actions in Ukraine have also led to an
expensive international backlash. The EU and the United States have placed several
rounds of sanctions on Russia, and Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia have
followed their example.35 The sanctions placed by the United States and Europe were
very similar, and began by targeting key individuals connected to Putin by freezing assets
and placing travel bans. When this proved largely ineffective, sanctions were placed on
the energy sector, keeping American and European energy companies from working with
Russian companies. Sanctions were also placed on Russian banks, shortening payment
deadlines to 30 days and prohibiting financial help from European and American banks.
Sanctions were then placed on the defense industry in Russia. Some of Russia’s military
and defense sector was not allowed access to financing, equipment, information, and
other materials related to the industry36. Finally, the EU and United States banned their
companies from doing business in Crimea in an effort to put stress on the peninsula.

Jason Bush, “Factbox- Costs and assets from Russia’s annexation of Crimea”, Reuters, 04/08/14,
accessed
10/17/16
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-crimea-costs-factboxidUKBREA370NY20140408
34

Wan Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis”, Journal of Politics and Law
Vol.
8
No.2,
pg.
1,
2015
accessed
3/4/2017
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1028.3835&rep=rep1&type=pdf
35

36

Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions”

Leigh Hansson, Michael Lowell, Sian Fellows, David Myers, Alexandra E. Allan, Alexandra Gordon, Hena
M. Schommer, Laith Najjar, Overview of U.S. and EU Sanctions on Russia, ReedSmith, October 2014,
accessed
on
12/2/16
https://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/9221cf81-e4f7-4907-ab2cf7dc249eac58/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/441e0ec9-dbd8-4c3a-b1fa-0bf7ed4d5872/alert_14255.pdf

25

According to Wan Wang, a scholar from Beijing Normal University, the sanctions
were extremely effective in damaging the Russian economy, but had different effects on
domestic sentiment, which will be discussed later on. According to Wang, the falling
price of oil combined with the sanctions led to shrinking federal reserves, $416 billion as
of February 2015, as well as a large amount of capital outflow between 2014 and 2015 37,
which is evidenced in Figure 7 from Trading Economics38.

Figure 7

According to Wang’s article, there are multiple ramifications of these sanctions.
The Russian government is estimated to lose $4-5 billion per year sanctions are in effect,
Russia’s credit rating has fallen to a lower level, GDP growth was negligible with
sanctions in effect, and sanctions over a long-term period would limit modernization in
Russia due to a lack of technology and investment inflow39.
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS IN
UKRAINE

Public feeling towards the Russian government has been deeply affected by
Russian actions in Ukraine. Those within Russia have been told that the government acts
for the best interests of Russians across the globe and support Putin with a renewed vigor.
Even as international sanctions damn Moscow’s actions, many Russians believe that the
government has acted well within their rights and in the defense of all Russians. Some of
this reaction may come from Russia not declaring a formal war. Societies, in general,
tend to react negatively to any declaration of war. Using hybrid warfare, the Kremlin
was able to avoid this decline in public opinion, while still engaging in damaging
operations. On the other hand, Russia has lost any popularity it had among Western
nations with its hybrid war in Ukraine. Because of the damage Moscow was able to
cause through hybrid warfare without any formal military engagement, NATO members
such as the Baltics are especially fearful. It is possible that NATO’s Article V will not
constitute a military engagement under hybrid war, meaning that the Baltics could be at
great risk should Russia decide to use it against them. Because of the threat from Russia,
NATO has taken steps to defend its members from any possible attack, causing further
tensions on Russia’s western border. This reaction differs from that of a normal military
intervention or engagement, as NATO would have been justified in positioning far more
soldiers and equipment along their eastern border. Were NATO to do that now, Russia
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would be able to spin it as proof of NATO aggression and further their disinformation
campaign against the West. Since the West has reacted poorly to Russian actions,
Moscow has turned to the East to find allies and partners, specifically China.
By considering these political ramifications of Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine, I
can determine whether Russia, as well as the Russian administration, has experienced a
positive political or environment, or an environment that often condemns Moscow’s
actions and has led to political problems for Russia.

It may prove that Putin’s

administration has gained while the rest of Russia faces losses.
Domestic Effects
One would expect the recession that followed the events in Ukraine to have
turned domestic sentiment against the Russian government as citizens faced increased
prices and economic hardships. However, it seems the opposite is true. The recession
that followed Russia’s actions in Ukraine was met with increased support for the Putin
administration40.

Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “Russian Public Opinion: Putin Praised, West
Panned”, Pew Research Center, 2015, accessed 3/8/2017 http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/2-russianpublic-opinion-putin-praised-west-panned/
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Figure 8

Figure 9
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Based on Figures 8 and 9, confidence in Putin has been on the rise since his
election in 2012. One would expect that confidence in Putin would be affected by severe
economic changes, especially those with as many negative repercussions as the fall in oil
prices and international sanctions. But the opposite appears to be true. In fact, data from
the Pew Research Center shows that a large majority of Russian citizens approve of his
handling of the Russian economy specifically (Figure 10). This data corresponds with
Levada-Center polls, however, Levada-Center also shows that Russian approval of the
government is only at 43%, with the disapproval rating at 55% as of March 2017.41 This
further establishes that Putin has made gains politically while the image of the Russian
government as a whole has been damaged.
Putin has also gained approval based on his handling of international relations.
Figure 10 demonstrates that a sizeable majority of Russian citizens firmly support Putin’s
actions regarding Western countries and organizations. Based on this poll, Russians have
no interest in seeking closer relations with the United States or members of the EU. It
may be that Russian citizens feel this way because blame for violence in Ukraine has
been laid at the feet of the West. Media in Russia has blamed the United States and
NATO for encouraging Western expansionism, which has led to Russia having to
reaffirm its influence in the area as a defensive measure42. Russians also overwhelmingly
support Putin’s handling of relations in Ukraine. Many within Russia believe Ukraine to
be a part of Russia, which may explain some of the support for Russia’s actions in
41
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Ukraine. Overall, these feelings could be influenced by what has been called a rise in
Russian nationalism over the years. In the past 5 years, favorable opinion of America,
Germany, the EU, and NATO have all fallen by at least half. At the time of polling,
nationalism within Russia was very high, with 90% of those polled having a favorable
opinion of their country43. With the public supporting nationalist ideas such as this, it is
little wonder why Moscow has seen to fit to use hybrid warfare to control the region.

Figure 10

International Repercussions
Russians’ view of their economy is the only public opinion that seems to have
changed drastically due to incidents in Ukraine and following events. Putin’s popularity
has continued to climb, as opinion for the West declines. International opinion of the
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Russian government shows a more dynamic reaction to intervention in Crimea and the
Donbass. A poll of eight countries seen in Figure 11 (US, Canada, UK, Germany, Italy,
France, Spain, Poland) in 2014, shows that opinion of Putin and Russia plummeted after
events in Ukraine. Opinion of Russia overall had been on a general downward trend in
many of these countries, but in each case there was a decrease in confidence in Russia
between 2013 and 201444. As the polls were conducted between April and May each
year, public opinion would reflect how the international community reacted to Russia’s
use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine in the early months of their involvement.
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Figure 11
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Figure 12

Many of these nations also see Moscow’s actions in Ukraine as a threat to their
own safety. The overwhelming majority of people polled see Russia as some kind of
threat, and nearly half of all people polled see Russia as a major threat to its neighbors.
Poland specifically has a large majority (Figure 12) that believe Russia is a major threat
to its neighbors in the wake of events in Ukraine45.
Russia faced consequences in nearly every international organization it was a
member of.

Russia was first removed from the G8, followed by a stop to cooperation

from NATO and the EU. Russia also saw fewer visits from Western delegates and
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higher-ups46. The relationship between German and Russian leaders has deteriorated to
that of businesslike, with none of the previous cooperation and agreement found in past
years47. Cooperation between NATO and Moscow has disintegrated. Instead, the idea of
Russia being a threat and an enemy to NATO has returned. Steps are being taken along
NATO’s eastern border to defend against potential Russian aggression such as deploying
troops along Russia’s border in the Baltics and in Poland48.
As the West shuns Russia, Moscow finds new connections in the East. Russia has
been noticeably increasing relations with Eastern countries for several years, but these
efforts have become more noticeable since early 2014. Many of the more developed
economies, such as Japan or South Korea, in Asia are reliant on the United States, and so
have followed the Western example of placing sanctions on Russia. This makes China
the most receptive trading partner in the region.
China has been amicable towards Russia in recent years because it has been
through similar events 49 . China has experienced its own revolutions, so understands
Russia’s fear of Maidan revolutions and their ability to spread. China is also against
interfering in the domestic matters of other nations, so abstained from the UN Crimea
vote. Actions like this have led to closer relations between China and Russia. Not all of
Beijing’s actions are motivated by sympathy, however. Russia finds itself without many
partners, allowing China to get cheaper hydrocarbons. Russia can also be a valuable ally
Dmitri Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry”, Carnegie Moscow
Center,
2014,
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in the ongoing territory disputes along China’s Pacific coastline. Further, China may be
able to gain advanced weapons technology from Russia in return for continued trade
partnerships. Closer ties between Beijing and Moscow could also lead to the intertwining
of the Silk Road Project and the Eurasian Economic Union, further bonding Russia to the
East 50 . Thus, Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine seems to have benefitted Beijing.
Moscow’s actions have left few states willing to bargain with them, leaving most of the
negotiating power in China’s hands.
Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine has been met with varying reactions
from domestic and foreign populations. Russians hail Putin as a hero because they
believe he has stood up for their rights and culture, and is attempting to rebuild Russia
into what it was before. Some of these ideas, if not all, most likely came from Russian
media as they fermented support for the government, much like how Russian media in
Ukraine polarized the Russian population. International opinion of Russia’s actions in
Ukraine is generally united as well.

Western countries overwhelmingly condemn

Moscow’s decision to use force and hybrid tactics in Ukraine and refuse to accept that
Crimea has been annexed by Russia.

Russia has also gone from an occasionally

unreliable trading partner, to a perceived threat and possible enemy to many European
countries. NATO members are especially worried, as Russia may be looking to damage
the organization by proving it is unreliable and Article V is not to be trusted. There may
be some truth in that belief based on public opinion of how NATO should respond in that
situation 51. China has now become a major partner of Moscow’s and the relationship
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will most likely continue to grow as Russia finds itself further ostracized from the West.
This could lead to military cooperation and has already amounted to trade deals and
energy agreements lasting for decades. Putin may have lost some popularity in the West,
but there was little there to be had in the first place. Instead, he has chosen to be feared in
the West, revered in his own country, and an ally to the East. This has placed him in a
more advantageous position for the future.
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CONCLUSION

Based on these findings, regarding the pre-existing conditions, the Russian
economy, and political ramifications of hybrid warfare, it can be determined that Russia’s
use of hybrid warfare was a relative success. As I mentioned earlier, Russia’s goals for
hybrid warfare in Ukraine have not been entirely disclosed, so some must be assumed.
Moscow has said that their motivation for intervening in Ukraine comes from the need to
protect ethnic Russians across the globe. It is extremely plausible that Russia also chose
to use force in Ukraine to push back NATO expansionism. Moscow has often let their
displeasure with NATO’s eastern growth be known, arguing tooth and nail against both
the EU and NATO’s expansion eastward.

Leaders in Moscow have also shown a

tendency to use military force as a political tool. The people of Russia respond favorably
to demonstrations of Russian strength. Events in Ukraine could be much of the same.
Finally, Russia may have hoped that conflict in the Donbass area would lead to the
Russian border moving further west.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea made it impossible for Ukraine to join NATO or
the EU. Both organizations have strict rules of controlling all of one’s territory. By
causing friction in the Donbass region, Russia further removed Ukraine’s chances of
becoming a European ally. So, were it a goal of Russia’s to keep neighboring nations
from joining Western organizations, Russia’s use of hybrid warfare would have been
extremely successful. Russia was able to fragment Ukraine without needing to admit
38

guilt until much later. When Moscow did admit to its military involvement, the media
was able to turn the events into a success for all of Russia.
Shows of force often come with an increase in leader popularity, and Russia is no
different. Even though the Russian people face economic downturn and international
backlash, they still believe Putin to be a great leader. Their support is likely tied to the
spin Moscow has been able to put on events. Because Russia is fighting for Russians
everywhere, the Russian people feel better protected. The annexation of Crimea is not
illegal; it is only the restoration of the peninsula to its rightful homeland. By using the
media to twist events into a favorable light, Putin’s administration has indeed become
more popular.
Finally, Russia may have been attempting to pull some or all of Ukraine within its
borders, striving for what has been called New Russia (or Novorossiya) 52. As of now,
Russia has only succeeded in gaining Crimea, and even that is debatable, as many nations
refuse to acknowledge the referendum. Along the Ukrainian-Russian border, the Donetsk
and Lugansk People’s Republics have declared themselves apart from Ukraine. They
have not joined Russia, however, and it is unlikely Ukraine will allow them independence
at any point soon. Here is the first goal that Russia did not achieve immediately. In the
coming years, it is not likely, but possible, that these People’s Republics will win their
independence. Should this happen, they will most likely quickly ally themselves with
Russia, becoming dependent on Russia to keep them afloat. So while Russia has not

‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, President of Russia website, 18 March 2014, accessed
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52

39

been able to gain as much territory as they may have hoped, it is still possible for them to
do so in the future.
As I stated in chapter 2, these successes did not come without substantial costs.
However, Russia’s successes with hybrid warfare in Ukraine have outweighed whatever
price tags may be associated with them. Russia has kept Ukraine from becoming part of
the West. They have also proven that they are able to exert control over nations within
their sphere of influence. Putin has come out of the crisis with a higher popularity rating
than ever before, and will most likely use this to his advantage in the upcoming Russian
elections. Russia has gained Crimea and promised the people to raise their standard of
living. While this proves to be a costly project, it will ingratiate the people of Crimea to
Russia. Based on this, Russia has been successful in its use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine.
Because Russia has been successful, it stands to reason that Moscow may see fit to
continue the practice of hybrid aggression in the future. Countries that have similar
vulnerabilities to Ukraine, such as the Baltics, may soon become targets.
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